HP OpenView NNM webappmon.exe execvp nc Remote Code Execution, # Angielskie Ebooki
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//--> Abysssec Research1) Advisory information Title : HP OpenView NNM webappmon.exe execvp_nc Remote Code Execution Version : OpenView Network Node Manager 7.53 Analysis : Vendor : Impact : Critical Contact : shahin [at] abysssec.com , info [at] abysssec.com Twitter : @abysssec CVE : CVE-‐2010-‐2703 2) Vulnerable version HP OpenView Network Node Manager 7.53 HP OpenView Network Node Manager 7.51 3) Vulnerability information Class 1-‐ Buffer overflow Impact Remotely Exploitable Yes Locally Exploitable Yes An attacker can exploit this issue to execute arbitrary code with SYSTEM-levelprivileges. Successful exploits will completely compromise affected computers. 4) Vulnerabilities detail In this section according to the file name and vulnerable function patched and unpatched sections of the execvp_nc function are compared: UnPatch.text:5A0227D9 push offset asc_5A04395C ; Dest .text:5A0227DE lea edx, [ebp+CommandLine] .text:5A0227E4 push edx ; Str .text:5A0227E5 call strcat_new .text:5A0227EA add esp, 8 .text:5A0227ED mov eax, [ebp+var_8004] .text:5A0227F3 mov ecx, [ebp+arg_4] .text:5A0227F6 mov edx, [ecx+eax*4] .text:5A0227F9 push edx ; Source .text:5A0227FA lea eax, [ebp+CommandLine] .text:5A022800 push eax ; Dest .text:5A022801 call strcat_new .text:5A022806 add esp, 8 .text:5A022809 cmp [ebp+var_8004], 1 .text:5A022810 jle short loc_5A022826 .text:5A022812 push offset asc_5A043960 ; " " .text:5A022817 lea ecx, [ebp+Parameters] .text:5A02281D push ecx ; Dest .text:5A02281E call strcat_new .text:5A022823 add esp, 8 .text:5A022826 .text:5A022826 loc_5A022826: ; CODE XREF: execvp_nc+A0j .text:5A022826 mov edx, [ebp+var_8004] .text:5A02282C mov eax, [ebp+arg_4] .text:5A02282F mov ecx, [eax+edx*4] .text:5A022832 push ecx ; Source .text:5A022833 lea edx, [ebp+Parameters] .text:5A022839 push edx ; Dest .text:5A02283A call strcat_new .text:5A02283F add esp, 8 .text:5A022842 jmp short loc_5A02288B Patch .text:5A02283D lea edx, [ebp+CommandLine] .text:5A022843 push edx ; Str .text:5A022844 call strlen_new .text:5A022849 add esp, 4 .text:5A02284C mov ecx, 3FFFh .text:5A022851 sub ecx, eax .text:5A022853 push ecx ; Count .text:5A022854 push offset Source ; " " .text:5A022859 lea edx, [ebp+CommandLine] .text:5A02285F push edx ; Dest .text:5A022860 call ds:strncat .text:5A022866 add esp, 0Ch .text:5A022869 mov [ebp+var_4001], 0 .text:5A022870 lea eax, [ebp+CommandLine] .text:5A022876 push eax ; Str .text:5A022877 call strlen_new .text:5A02287C add esp, 4 .text:5A02287F mov ecx, 3FFFh .text:5A022884 sub ecx, eax .text:5A022886 push ecx ; Count .text:5A022887 mov edx, [ebp+var_8004] .text:5A02288D mov eax, [ebp+arg_4] .text:5A022890 mov ecx, [eax+edx*4] .text:5A022893 push ecx ; Source .text:5A022894 lea edx, [ebp+CommandLine] .text:5A02289A push edx ; Dest .text:5A02289B call ds:strncat .text:5A0228A1 add esp, 0Ch .text:5A0228A4 mov [ebp+var_4001], 0 .text:5A0228AB cmp [ebp+var_8004], 1 .text:5A0228B2 jle short loc_5A0228E4 .text:5A0228B4 lea eax, [ebp+Parameters] .text:5A0228BA push eax ; Str .text:5A0228BB call strlen_new .text:5A0228C0 add esp, 4 .text:5A0228C3 mov ecx, 3FFFh .text:5A0228C8 sub ecx, eax .text:5A0228CA push ecx ; Count .text:5A0228CB push offset asc_5A043998 ; " " .text:5A0228D0 lea edx, [ebp+Parameters] .text:5A0228D6 push edx ; Dest .text:5A0228D7 call ds:strncat .text:5A0228DD add esp, 0Ch .text:5A0228E0 mov [ebp+var_1], 0 .text:5A0228E4 .text:5A0228E4 loc_5A0228E4: ; CODE XREF: execvp_nc+E2j .text:5A0228E4 lea eax, [ebp+Parameters] .text:5A0228EA push eax ; Str .text:5A0228EB call strlen_new .text:5A0228F0 add esp, 4 .text:5A0228F3 mov ecx, 3FFFh .text:5A0228F8 sub ecx, eax .text:5A0228FA push ecx ; Count .text:5A0228FB mov edx, [ebp+var_8004] .text:5A022901 mov eax, [ebp+arg_4] .text:5A022904 mov ecx, [eax+edx*4] .text:5A022907 push ecx ; Source .text:5A022908 lea edx, [ebp+Parameters] .text:5A02290E push edx ; Dest .text:5A02290F call ds:strncat .text:5A022915 add esp, 0Ch .text:5A022918 mov [ebp+var_1], 0 .text:5A02291C jmp short loc_5A022965 As demonstrated above in the unpatched version by calling the strcat_new at address 0x5A0227E5, it adds one of input values for the function at offset asc_5A04395C to a fixed length array that address of the array is in the edx register. In this operation there is no check on the copied value to the fixed length array. In the patched version by calling strlen_new first the length of the input will be stored in eax and then this value will be substitute from 3FFFh and the result of this operation will be pushed on the stack as the number of copies to the calling of strncat function at address 0x5A022860. And with this value length of the copied string in the fixed length array is checked. In the unpatched version by calling the strcat_new at address 0x5A022801, two string are concatenated with each other without any check. In the patched version by calling strlen before strncat at address 0x 5A022877 length of the string is checked.Similar checking conditions are performed in address 0x 5A0228BB , 0x 5A0228EB. In the following section we have a python script that send a long request to the cgi webappmon.exe. After running the script a stack overflow occurs in the program and the error will be displayed on the screen. This script sends a request based on the ping command to the webappmon.exe. We have used the POST operation in http protocol because of long data. The proof of concept is attached as poc.py Here is the result after running the script: fatal error -‐ scanner input buffer overflow [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
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//--> Abysssec Research1) Advisory information Title : HP OpenView NNM webappmon.exe execvp_nc Remote Code Execution Version : OpenView Network Node Manager 7.53 Analysis : Vendor : Impact : Critical Contact : shahin [at] abysssec.com , info [at] abysssec.com Twitter : @abysssec CVE : CVE-‐2010-‐2703 2) Vulnerable version HP OpenView Network Node Manager 7.53 HP OpenView Network Node Manager 7.51 3) Vulnerability information Class 1-‐ Buffer overflow Impact Remotely Exploitable Yes Locally Exploitable Yes An attacker can exploit this issue to execute arbitrary code with SYSTEM-levelprivileges. Successful exploits will completely compromise affected computers. 4) Vulnerabilities detail In this section according to the file name and vulnerable function patched and unpatched sections of the execvp_nc function are compared: UnPatch.text:5A0227D9 push offset asc_5A04395C ; Dest .text:5A0227DE lea edx, [ebp+CommandLine] .text:5A0227E4 push edx ; Str .text:5A0227E5 call strcat_new .text:5A0227EA add esp, 8 .text:5A0227ED mov eax, [ebp+var_8004] .text:5A0227F3 mov ecx, [ebp+arg_4] .text:5A0227F6 mov edx, [ecx+eax*4] .text:5A0227F9 push edx ; Source .text:5A0227FA lea eax, [ebp+CommandLine] .text:5A022800 push eax ; Dest .text:5A022801 call strcat_new .text:5A022806 add esp, 8 .text:5A022809 cmp [ebp+var_8004], 1 .text:5A022810 jle short loc_5A022826 .text:5A022812 push offset asc_5A043960 ; " " .text:5A022817 lea ecx, [ebp+Parameters] .text:5A02281D push ecx ; Dest .text:5A02281E call strcat_new .text:5A022823 add esp, 8 .text:5A022826 .text:5A022826 loc_5A022826: ; CODE XREF: execvp_nc+A0j .text:5A022826 mov edx, [ebp+var_8004] .text:5A02282C mov eax, [ebp+arg_4] .text:5A02282F mov ecx, [eax+edx*4] .text:5A022832 push ecx ; Source .text:5A022833 lea edx, [ebp+Parameters] .text:5A022839 push edx ; Dest .text:5A02283A call strcat_new .text:5A02283F add esp, 8 .text:5A022842 jmp short loc_5A02288B Patch .text:5A02283D lea edx, [ebp+CommandLine] .text:5A022843 push edx ; Str .text:5A022844 call strlen_new .text:5A022849 add esp, 4 .text:5A02284C mov ecx, 3FFFh .text:5A022851 sub ecx, eax .text:5A022853 push ecx ; Count .text:5A022854 push offset Source ; " " .text:5A022859 lea edx, [ebp+CommandLine] .text:5A02285F push edx ; Dest .text:5A022860 call ds:strncat .text:5A022866 add esp, 0Ch .text:5A022869 mov [ebp+var_4001], 0 .text:5A022870 lea eax, [ebp+CommandLine] .text:5A022876 push eax ; Str .text:5A022877 call strlen_new .text:5A02287C add esp, 4 .text:5A02287F mov ecx, 3FFFh .text:5A022884 sub ecx, eax .text:5A022886 push ecx ; Count .text:5A022887 mov edx, [ebp+var_8004] .text:5A02288D mov eax, [ebp+arg_4] .text:5A022890 mov ecx, [eax+edx*4] .text:5A022893 push ecx ; Source .text:5A022894 lea edx, [ebp+CommandLine] .text:5A02289A push edx ; Dest .text:5A02289B call ds:strncat .text:5A0228A1 add esp, 0Ch .text:5A0228A4 mov [ebp+var_4001], 0 .text:5A0228AB cmp [ebp+var_8004], 1 .text:5A0228B2 jle short loc_5A0228E4 .text:5A0228B4 lea eax, [ebp+Parameters] .text:5A0228BA push eax ; Str .text:5A0228BB call strlen_new .text:5A0228C0 add esp, 4 .text:5A0228C3 mov ecx, 3FFFh .text:5A0228C8 sub ecx, eax .text:5A0228CA push ecx ; Count .text:5A0228CB push offset asc_5A043998 ; " " .text:5A0228D0 lea edx, [ebp+Parameters] .text:5A0228D6 push edx ; Dest .text:5A0228D7 call ds:strncat .text:5A0228DD add esp, 0Ch .text:5A0228E0 mov [ebp+var_1], 0 .text:5A0228E4 .text:5A0228E4 loc_5A0228E4: ; CODE XREF: execvp_nc+E2j .text:5A0228E4 lea eax, [ebp+Parameters] .text:5A0228EA push eax ; Str .text:5A0228EB call strlen_new .text:5A0228F0 add esp, 4 .text:5A0228F3 mov ecx, 3FFFh .text:5A0228F8 sub ecx, eax .text:5A0228FA push ecx ; Count .text:5A0228FB mov edx, [ebp+var_8004] .text:5A022901 mov eax, [ebp+arg_4] .text:5A022904 mov ecx, [eax+edx*4] .text:5A022907 push ecx ; Source .text:5A022908 lea edx, [ebp+Parameters] .text:5A02290E push edx ; Dest .text:5A02290F call ds:strncat .text:5A022915 add esp, 0Ch .text:5A022918 mov [ebp+var_1], 0 .text:5A02291C jmp short loc_5A022965 As demonstrated above in the unpatched version by calling the strcat_new at address 0x5A0227E5, it adds one of input values for the function at offset asc_5A04395C to a fixed length array that address of the array is in the edx register. In this operation there is no check on the copied value to the fixed length array. In the patched version by calling strlen_new first the length of the input will be stored in eax and then this value will be substitute from 3FFFh and the result of this operation will be pushed on the stack as the number of copies to the calling of strncat function at address 0x5A022860. And with this value length of the copied string in the fixed length array is checked. In the unpatched version by calling the strcat_new at address 0x5A022801, two string are concatenated with each other without any check. In the patched version by calling strlen before strncat at address 0x 5A022877 length of the string is checked.Similar checking conditions are performed in address 0x 5A0228BB , 0x 5A0228EB. In the following section we have a python script that send a long request to the cgi webappmon.exe. After running the script a stack overflow occurs in the program and the error will be displayed on the screen. This script sends a request based on the ping command to the webappmon.exe. We have used the POST operation in http protocol because of long data. The proof of concept is attached as poc.py Here is the result after running the script: fatal error -‐ scanner input buffer overflow [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]